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INTRODUCTION
Trade secret law protects facts, ideas, inventions and information.
A trade secret can be any information of value used in one’s business that has been kept secret and provides an economic advantage
over competitors.1 Because companies invest millions of dollars in
research, development, and other aspects of their business that
provide their competitive edge,2 they rely on the protections provided under trade secret law as an incentive to invest the resources
to create trade secrets, and to share those secrets with employees.3
Trade secret protection is attractive, relative to other kinds of intellectual property protection, in part because of the broad scope of
information that is protectable and the relative ease with which a
business can claim such protection.4 Securing trade secret information is the most critical task for any putative trade secret holder
because once a trade secret has been disclosed, even if inadvertently, it ceases to be a trade secret.5
Trade secrets are arguably more important now to companies
than ever in our history. In fact, since the most recent revisions to
our patent laws, many believe that trade secrets might be even more
important than patents.6 Accordingly, the theft of trade secrets or
1. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 1939).
2. See generally JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN , TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND
EXPLOITATION 12-13 (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs ed., 1998).
3. See id. at 5-13; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN , COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 152-53 (2d ed. 1981).
4. See Brooks W. Taylor, You Can’t Say That!: Enjoining Publication of Trade Secrets
Despite the First Amendment, 9 COMPUT . L. REV. & TECH . J. 393, 394-95 (2005) (discussing
reasons why corporations rely on trade secret protection).
5. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 376
n.53, 379 (2002). While the risk of loss is one that is inherent in choosing this form of
protection, it does not necessarily suggest that a trade secret owner should have instead
chosen patent protection. See id. at 379-81. One who chooses trade-secret protection over
patent protection has not necessarily forgone a “better” form of protection, especially since
there is a wide range of information that is eligible for trade-secret protection but not patent
protection. See, e.g., id.; see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.01[1] [a] at 3-4 (Charles
Tait Graves 2007) (1997).
6. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 1091, 1104-06 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
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trade secret misappropriation from company employees and from
outsiders, such as competitors and foreign governments, is on the
rise.7
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret protection.8 With Massachusetts’s
recent adoption (effective October 1, 2018),9 a total of forty-nine
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have adopted the UTSA (with some variation).10 The only
state that has not yet adopted the UTSA in some form is New
York.11
After over one hundred years of trade secrecy being the only area
of intellectual property (IP) governed by state law, the most significant development to this area of law was the passage of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA).12 President Obama signed
the DTSA, and it went into effect on May 11, 2016.13 The DTSA is
the first federal law in the United States to create a federal civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.14 The DTSA
largely mirrors the UTSA, with a nearly identical definition of
“trade secret,” an identical definition of “misappropriation,” and
other similarities.15 Significantly, the DTSA does not preempt or
displace state law (except, in some respects), meaning that the
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN . L. REV. 311, 330 (2008); Tom C.W.
Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 943 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Almeling, supra note 6, at 1099-100, 1105, 1110-12.
8. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
9. Jacob W. Schneider & Taylor Han, Exploring the Pre-Disocovery Trade Secret Identification Requirement in Massachusetts and Across the Country, HOLLAND & KNIGHT: TRADE
SECRETS BLOG (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.hklaw.com/TradeSecretsBlog/Exploring-the-PreDiscovery-Trade-Secret-Identification-Requirement-in-Massachusetts-and-Across-theCountry-11-20-2018/ [https://perma.cc/R7UM-AL9Z].
10. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM ’N , http://www.nccusl.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/SFU2-BGHD].
11. See id. North Carolina is often counted among the states that have adopted the UTSA
because it enacted a statute that is similar. However, because of certain modifications, the
Uniform Law Commissioners does not recognize North Carolina as an official adoptee. See
Trade Secrets Law and the UTSA: 50 State and Federal Law Survey, BECK REED RIDEN (Jan.
24, 2017), https://www.beckreedriden.com/trade-secrets-laws-and-the-utsa-a-50-state-andfederal-law-survey-chart/ [https://perma.cc/UPY5-4Z79].
12. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 380-82, 384-85
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832-1836, 1838-1839 (Supp. IV 2016)).
13. See §§ 1832-1836, 1838-1839.
14. See id.
15. Id. § 1839.
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United States now has two bodies of civil trade secret law developing in parallel: the DTSA and the UTSA.16
The DTSA’s enactment means that trade secret owners may now
bring a trade secret claim in state or federal court, a choice that was
previously available only if they could invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts or join their state trade secret claim with
another federal cause of action.17 Since the DTSA is largely based
upon the UTSA, and is likely to be interpreted in accordance with
the UTSA; the existence of two separate trade secret laws is not
likely to result in significant divergence of state and federal trade
secret principles, for most of the country.
As we enter the second year of the DTSA, this Article presents a
snapshot of developments to assess whether there appears to be any
significant doctrinal changes afoot in trade secret litigation—
including civil and/or criminal—during the past year. Professors
David Levine and Christopher Seaman provided some empirical
data and quantitative analysis of the case filings during the first
year of litigation under the DTSA (from May 2016 to May 2017).18
This Article complements their excellent work by taking a qualitative look at some of the substantive rulings from the following year.
My assessment based on this limited sampling is that there does not
appear to be any dramatic changes to the doctrinal development of
the law to date.19 Rather, courts continue to search for fairness as
they struggle with problems common to trade secret litigation
regarding, for instance, trade secret identification, misappropriation, and damages.20
Further contributing to the uniqueness of trade secret law is that,
given the evolution of trade secrecy from its state-based, common
law origins, it is probably more nuanced and inconsistent than its
other federal-law-based IP siblings (patents, trademarks, and
16. See id. § 1838.
17. See id. § 1836.
18. See David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study
of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
105, 123-151 (2018).
19. See infra Parts I, II; see generally SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADE
SECRET LAW : INCLUDING THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 IN A NUTSHELL (West
Academic 2d ed., 2018).
20. See infra Parts I.C, I.G, I.J.
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copyrights).21 Trade secret law is highly factual.22 Every state is
different, and the trade secrecy law is based upon and supported by
the public policy of the relevant states.23 Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of trade secrecy have become relatively well
grounded, so much so that the introduction of a federal law is unlikely to cause tremendous upheaval in its continuing doctrinal
development.24 Of course, it is far too soon to know what will happen
in the years ahead, and there are specific provisions from the DTSA
that will require judicial interpretation.25
This Article proceeds in four parts. Following this introduction,
Part I highlights some noteworthy civil cases from select federal and
state courts. The cases are organized topically to provide the reader
with a quick overview of recent rulings in various categories, from
stating a claim for trade secret misappropriation to discovery-related issues, including protective orders, as well as damages and
injunctive relief. Furthermore, to the extent some of the cases have
interpreted certain provisions of the DTSA, those cases are noted
separately. In Part II, the Article includes updates on criminal
convictions and indictments over the past year under the Economic
Espionage Act. These “headlines” are intended to provide a flavor of
the types of cases that are selected for criminal prosecution under
federal law. Finally, the Article concludes that there does not
appear to be any significant departures in the civil case law to date,
and that the criminal cases pursued by federal prosecutors continue
to reflect familiar patterns.
I. CIVIL CASE REVIEW
The majority of trade secret cases result from business relationships between the parties.26 In particular, most trade secret cases

21. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101
VA. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (2015).
22. See id. at 363-64.
23. See id. at 353.
24. See id.; see also Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 119.
25. See Symposium, Understanding the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA): The Federalization of Trade Secrecy, 50 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 331 (2017).
26. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 131-32, 134-35.
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arise in the employment context.27 Employers have the right to
protect and preserve trade secrets, confidential, and proprietary
information.28 When an employer discloses trade secrets in confidence to an employee during the course of his or her employment,
even without an enforceable restrictive covenant, the employer has
a legitimate interest in protecting that information.29 However,
careful consideration must be given to protecting trade secrets in a
way that does not unreasonably impinge on employees’ and other
users’ rights.
In addition to the employer-employee cases, many trade secret
cases involve actions between competitors.30 One of the goals of
trade secret law is “the maintenance of standards of commercial
ethics.”31 Thus, while competition is a valued part of doing business,
trade secret laws establish boundaries to ensure that this competition is not done unfairly.32 It is just as unfair to hire the former
employee of a competitor who will disclose the competitor’s trade
secrets, as it is to break into the competitor’s locked safe to steal its
secret formula.33 Accordingly, courts must strike the appropriate
balance between anti-competitive conduct and trade secret protection in deciding trade secret cases.
This Part provides an update on some of the civil trade secret
cases that were decided in both federal and state courts this past
year. Overall, it appears that most of these cases are still being
decided under the UTSA, but some do include claims under both the
UTSA and the DTSA.34 Cases that provided specific interpretations
of new provisions in the DTSA are noted at the end of the section.
27. See id. at 134-35.
28. See, e.g., New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass.
1977); D.C. Wiring, Inc. v. Lamontagne, No. 91-1722, 1993 WL 818562, at *1-2 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1993); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805 (R.I. 1909).
29. See, e.g., Stevens & Co., 71 A. at 805.
30. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 18, at 122-23, 123 n.91.
31. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
32. See id. at 481-82.
33. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the
Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1429-30 (2009).
34. Only five of the cases reviewed were based on DTSA claims. They are Xoran Holdings
L.L.C. v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017); CPI Card Group,
Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 791 (D. Minn. 2018); Broker Genius, Inc. v. Zalta, 280 F. Supp.
3d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Christian v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 29, 2018); and Hawkins v. Fishbeck, 301 F. Supp. 3d 650 (W.D. Va. 2017).
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A. What Is Generally Known & Readily Ascertainable?
The definition of a trade secret under the UTSA and the DTSA
specifically precludes protection for information that is “generally
known” or “readily ascertainable.”35 The phrase “generally known”
is not defined by the UTSA or the DTSA, but the commentary to the
UTSA and applicable case law recognizes that the concept is not
limited to information that is known by the public at large.36
Information can be generally known and ineligible for trade secret
protection “[i]f the principal persons who can obtain economic
benefit from information are aware of it.”37 The “readily ascertainable” limitation focuses on how easily a trade secret could be discovered if anyone attempted to do so from a source other than the
putative trade secret owner.38 The focus is on whether the information is “knowable.”39
HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp. from the Eighth Circuit serves as
a reminder that information disclosed in a patent application cannot
be a trade secret.40 Such information becomes public knowledge, and
as such, it is excluded from coverage under the definition of “confidential” information for the purposes of the nondisclosure agreement at issue in the case.41
A plaintiff who claimed that its business strategy of marketing
its products through QVC was a trade secret could not sustain its
claim.42 In Yeiser Research & Dev. L.L.C. v. Teknor Apex Co., the
court noted that a competitor could easily ascertain this information
through public sources.43 This included a business strategy regard-

35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp. IV 2016).
36. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also
Broker Genius, Inc., 280 F. Supp. at 513-14, 516-17.
37. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
38. See id.
39. Id. § 2 cmt.
40. 888 F.3d 334, 341 (8th Cir. 2018).
41. See id. at 341-42.
42. See, e.g., Yeiser Research & Dev. L.L.C. v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d. 1021,
1046 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
43. 281 F. Supp. 3d at 1046-49.
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ing when and where plaintiff sold its products.44 Accordingly, the
plaintiff could not establish the existence of a trade secret.45
The Nevada Supreme Court in MEI-GSR Holdings, L.L.C. v.
Peppermill Casinos, Inc., was asked to determine whether, under
the Nevada Uniform Trade Secrets Act,46 a defendant is precluded
from demonstrating that certain information was readily ascertainable if the defendant acquired the information through improper
means.47 Interpreting the statute, the court held that the determination of whether information was “readily ascertainable by proper
means” was “not limited to the defendant’s conduct.”48 Furthermore,
the court noted:
Although a defendant’s acquisition of information by proper
means is a relevant consideration in determining whether the
information is a trade secret..., we hold that a defendant’s
acquisition of information by improper means does not preclude
the defendant from demonstrating that the information is
readily ascertainable by other persons.49

Thus, whether information is readily ascertainable or generally
known is a threshold inquiry in establishing that the type of information at issue qualifies for trade secret protection or is protectable as a trade secret.50
B. Failure to State a Claim?
In order to establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation under the UTSA and the DTSA, a plaintiff has the burden of pleading
and proving that: (1) plaintiff owns a trade secret; (2) one or more
of plaintiff’s trade secrets have been or are threatened to be misappropriated by the defendant; and (3) plaintiff is entitled to a remedy.51 Because the available remedies are broad, the focus of trade
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See id.
See id.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN . § 600A.030 (West 2017).
416 P.3d 249, 253 (Nev. 2018).
Id. at 254.
Id.
See, e.g., id.
See Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d, 954, 968 (E.D. Wisc. 2009)
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secret misappropriation cases is usually on the first and second requirements.52 Generally, the determination whether specific information is a trade secret is a mixed question of law and fact.53
Tension Envelope Corporation v. JBM Envelope Company from
the Eighth Circuit raises the interesting question of whether information created by a company’s customers can be protectable
information.54 The plaintiff in this case alleged that it produced
envelopes that complied with technical specifications generated by
its customers, not by the plaintiff itself.55 The Eighth Circuit held
that because these customer requirements could have been acquired
from the customers themselves, the plaintiff failed to state a claim
for misappropriation of trade secrets.56
In Krawiec v. Manly, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff’s description of its trade secret was
sufficient to allege the existence of a trade secret under the North
Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.57 The plaintiff, a dance
studio, described its trade secrets as “original ideas and concepts for
dance productions, marketing strategies and tactics, as well as
student, client and customer lists and their contact information.”58
The plaintiff provided no further details about these “ideas, concepts, strategies, and tactics” in order to put “defendants on notice
as to the precise information allegedly misappropriated.”59 Furthermore, the court found that the complaint did not show that the
plaintiff’s customer lists were trade secret because it failed to allege
that the list contained any information that would not be readily
accessible to defendants.60 The plaintiff therefore needed to provide
additional information sufficient to put the defendants and the court
(listing the elements of a prima facie case for trade secret misappropriation under California’s
version of the UTSA).
52. See infra Parts I.D, I.G; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 864 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
54. 876 F.3d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 2017).
55. See id. at 1115-16.
56. See id. at 1122-23.
57. 811 S.E. 2d 542 (N.C. 2018); see also N.C. GEN . STAT. ANN . § 66-153 (West 2017)
(outlining an action for misappropriation under the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection
Act).
58. Krawiec, 811 S.E. 2d at 549.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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on notice as to which “ideas, concepts, strategies, and tactics” were
allegedly misappropriated.61
C. Identification & Pleading with Specificity
It is not until a trade secret holder is actually in litigation that
the validity of its alleged trade secret rights are determined.62 The
first step in establishing the existence of a trade secret is to prove
that the information in question was a trade secret before the defendant misappropriated it.63 This means that the plaintiff must
identify the trade secret (precisely each piece of information the
plaintiff alleges is a trade secret) and show that it took reasonable
efforts to preserve this information.64 This often can be a challenge
for most plaintiffs.65
The plaintiff has a duty to identify its trade secrets with specificity.66 In most states, this requirement is imposed by case law and
pleading rules, but in California it is a statutory requirement.67
Similarly, the Wisconsin UTSA requires for injunctive relief “a
description of each alleged trade secret in sufficient detail to inform
the party to be enjoined or restrained of the nature of the complaint
against that party.”68 One reason for the specificity requirement is
to prevent a plaintiff from using trade secret litigation as a means
to conduct competitive intelligence through the guise of discovery.69

61. Id.
62. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447.
63. See id.; see also Robert A. Kearney, Why The Burden of Proving Causation Should
Shift to the Defendant Under the New Federal Trade Secret Act, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 3-4
(2016).
The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of success
on the merits standard used in preliminary injunction cases. Most trade secret
cases, particularly in the context of the problem presented here, will be decided
at a preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, use of this standard should present
no further difficulty, and may very well fold into the injunction test.
Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447 n.124.
64. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447.
65. See id.
66. See IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Systems Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002).
67. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2005).
68. WISC. STAT. ANN . § 134.90(3)(a) (West 2011).
69. See DeRubeis v. Witten Tech., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 680 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
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It also serves the due process purpose of letting defendants know
the details of the claims against them.
The obligation that trade secrets be identified with particularity
is not merely a pleading or evidentiary requirement; it is a very
practical requirement. Unless the plaintiff can articulate its putative trade secrets in a very concrete way, there is no way to test
whether the information meets the requirements for trade secrecy.
This is often a challenge for trade secret owners who tend to claim
trade secrecy for broad or vague categories of information. By doing
so, they may undermine their ability to show that the information
is not generally known and has independent economic value.70
The Eleventh Circuit in EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., addressed whether conclusory allegations are sufficient to withstand
a motion for summary judgment.71 Even though the court ruled that
“whether a particular type of information constitutes a trade secret
is a question of fact,” conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts are insufficient to resist summary judgment.72 In this
case, the district court had found that the rather general information contained in the defendant’s emails at issue contained trade
secrets.73 An affidavit supporting the plaintiff’s claim and declaring
that certain information “was not publicly available” and that it
gave the plaintiff “a competitive advantage” without fleshing out the
details was not enough.74 Another court reviewing confidential information disclosed in emails by a former employee, also found that
“generalized assertions” would not be sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proving that it had legitimate trade secrets.75
Similarly, in RE/MAX, LLC v. Quicken Loans Inc., the court dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for trade secret misappropriation as conclusory, because it did not provide sufficient facts to
support its argument.76 For instance, the court reasoned that defendant simply states that:

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See, e.g., Blake v. Prof. Coin Grading Serv., 898 F. Supp. 2d 365, 379 (D. Mass. 2012).
703 F. App’x 803, 810 (11th Cir. 2017).
See id.
See id. at 810-11.
Id. at 811.
See CPI Card Group, Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 791, 809 (D. Minn. 2018).
295 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1176 (D. Colo. 2018).
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[u]pon information and belief, [plaintiff] used and shared
confidential information it obtained about [defendant’s] confidential, proprietary, and trade secret processes and marketing
strategies through the negotiation and implementation of the
Agreement to develop, launch, and operate Motto Mortgage.
While [defendant] alleges various reasons to suspect [plaintiff]
was economically motivated to use [defendant’s] confidential
information for such a purpose, [defendant] does not allege any
facts tending to show that it actually did use such information.77

Thus, the court pointed out that the defendant did not allege anything about plaintiff’s operations that suggested it used defendant’s
confidential business information.78 Indeed, the court noted that the
only similarities that defendant alleges between its operations and
plaintiff’s were the “superficial similarity that [plaintiff] is in the
same industry and the irrelevant claim that [plaintiff] ‘copied [defendant’s] slogan,’ which is not confidential.”79 Finding that these
allegations were insufficient to suggest a plausible inference that
the defendant was harmed by the plaintiff’s use of its confidential
information, the court dismissed the counterclaim.80
In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gemma, however, the defendants
were unsuccessful in dismissing the complaint for lack of specificity.81 Defendants argued that under the Pennsylvania Uniform
Trade Secrets Act,82 the complaint did not describe the alleged trade
secrets with sufficient specificity, or explain how the defendants
obtained the trade secrets, or used the trade secrets.83 The court
found that the plaintiff alleged that defendants “misappropriated
various documents, including customer lists and other customer
information.”84 Because misappropriation under the statute requires the “following elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret;
(2) communication of the trade secret pursuant to a confidential
relationship; (3) use of the trade secret, in violation of that confi77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1173 (internal citations omitted).
See id.
Id.
See id.
301 F. Supp. 3d 523, 541 (W.D. Pa. 2018).
12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN . § 5301 (West 2004).
See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. at 540.
Id.
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dence; and (4) harm to the plaintiff,” the court deemed the complaint to be sufficient.85
D. Reasonable Efforts
“In almost every state, the reasonable efforts requirement is
embedded in the threshold legal question of trade secret misappropriation analysis: whether the plaintiff owns a legally protectable
trade secret.”86 Reasonable efforts require that in order to qualify for
trade secret protection, the information must be “the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.”87 The reasonable efforts requirement mandates that a
trade secret holder “show more than mere intent to protect something as a trade secret; actual effort to keep the information secret
is necessary.”88
Whether a trade secret owner has utilized appropriate safeguards
sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts requirement is a question
of fact, based on the particular circumstances.89 Thus, the decisions
necessitate a balancing between using sufficient precautions to
protect a company’s secret on the one hand, while not imposing
overly-burdensome precautions that would impair the functioning
of its business on the other hand.90
In CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, a software provider brought an action
against its former employee and competitor, alleging that the
defendants misappropriated a number of trade secrets, including its
source code.91 In considering the extent of measures taken to guard
the secrecy of the source code, the court found that the source code
had been installed on the county’s servers for about twenty years,
85. Id.
86. Elizabeth A. Rowe, RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 409 (2006).
87. See id. (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538
(2005)).
88. Id.; see also Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.
1983) (“[E]ven under the common law, more than an ‘intention’ was required—the plaintiff
was required to show that it had manifested that intention by making some effort to keep the
information secret.”).
89. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir.
1991).
90. See id. at 178-80.
91. 306 F. Supp. 3d 857, 864, 877 (S.D.W. Va. 2018).
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it was not encrypted, password-protected, or labeled confidential;
nor did the plaintiff require any confidentiality agreements when it
provided the source code to its clients (the various counties).92
Accordingly, the court concluded that the source code was not the
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and therefore
could not be a trade secret.93
The Southern District of NewYork in Broker Genius, Inc. v. Zalta,
(applying the DTSA) similarly found that the plaintiff had not taken
reasonable efforts to protect its software.94 The company regularly
disclosed its alleged trade secrets to its customers without requiring
them to sign confidentiality agreements.95 It gave “unfettered access” to the software, as well as extensive training, user manuals,
and videos that explained how the software works and its functionalities.96 In light of these findings, the plaintiff was unable to
show that it took reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of the
information.97
E. Independent Economic Value
The independent economic value requirement of trade secrecy is
an often overlooked and misapplied part of the trade secrecy
analysis. Technically, the “value” that is required is not any value
viewed in the abstract, but a particular kind of value. The plaintiff
in a trade secret misappropriation case has the burden of pleading
and proving that its putative trade secret: (1) “derives”; (2) “independent”; (3) “economic value, actual or potential”; (4) “from not
being generally known or readily ascertainable by” (that is, from
being secret); (5) “other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use.”98
The specifics of the economic value requirement are often given
only brief attention by courts and litigants. Frequently, courts
92. See id. at 877-78.
93. See id. at 878-79.
94. 280 F. Supp. 3d 495, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 520.
97. See id. at 521-22.
98. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp. IV 2016).
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assume that the alleged trade secrets must have the requisite
economic value, otherwise the plaintiff would not have initiated
litigation.99 Plaintiffs sometimes discount or obscure the requirement in order to make it easier for them to prove their prima facie
case.
Cy Wakeman, Inc. v. Nicole Price Consulting, L.L.C., addressed
independent economic value as it relates to secrecy.100 Here, the
plaintiff alleged that the customer relationships between it and
certain clients were confidential.101 The court, interpreting Nebraska’s UTSA, noted, however, that even if those relationships
were sufficiently secret, it was unclear how they provided independent economic value to others.102 According to the court, secrecy alone
does not equal economic value.103 The plaintiff argued that the value
created by the secrecy of the plaintiff’s client lists is the business
those clients generate, and that business would be lost if the plaintiff was unable to maintain their privacy.104 “But that is just value
to [the plaintiff], and is not independent value. [Plaintiff] has identified no one else who could obtain an economic advantage from
knowing who [plaintiff’s] confidential clients are.”105 Thus, the court
reasoned that there was no evidence that a competitor with knowledge of the plaintiff’s client relationships could reap economic value
just from knowing them.106
The Ohio Supreme Court in In re Review of Alternative Energy
Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co., in assessing whether
protective orders were properly granted, engaged in an analysis of
independent economic value.107 The relevant party in this case, a
utility company, had entered into confidentiality agreements with
99. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff’s customer database had potential economic value because it would
allow competitors to direct efforts to potential customers already using the plaintiff’s services);
Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., No. 92 Civ. 3653 (JSM), 1993 WL 541219, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (holding that the plaintiff’s alleged trade secret had economic value
because the defendant and another company considered licensing the rights to the secret).
100. 284 F. Supp. 3d 985, 995-96 (D. Neb. 2018).
101. See id. at 995.
102. See id. at 995-96.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 996.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. 106 N.E.3d 1, 9-10 (Ohio 2018).

2019]

SNAPSHOT OF TRADE SECRET DEVELOPMENTS

61

its suppliers to prevent the disclosure of certain supplier and pricing
information submitted during a competitive bid process.108 The
Public Utilities Commission granted the protective orders, but the
Environmental Law and Policy Center and the Office of the Ohio
Consumers Council challenged the protective orders and sought
disclosure of the records.109 They argued that the information was
not entitled to trade secret protection because, among other things,
it did not meet the independent economic value requirement.110
They further argued that the Public Utilities Commission did not
explain how the sealed information, in light of its age and changes
in market conditions that have transpired over time, has retained
its economic value in today’s market.111 The Commission, on the
other hand, asserted that “if [the] trade secret information was
public, it could discourage REC suppliers’ confidence in the market
and impede the function of the REC market.”112 The court concluded
that “[w]hile trade secrets may continue to be protected if the information retained some measure of value,” the Commission had
failed to cite to specific evidence to explain its protective order.113
F. Preliminary Injunctions
The basic principles of injunctive relief that were developed at
common law continue to be applied under the UTSA and DTSA.
Generally, before a court grants a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury
if the injunction is denied; (3) that the balance of hardships favors
the moving party; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the
public interest.114
In Mercer Health & Benefits L.L.C. v. DiGregorio, the Southern
District of New York granted a preliminary injunction enforcing
108. See id. at 8.
109. See id. at 7-8.
110. See id. at 9-10.
111. See id. at 8.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id.
114. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 506 N.E.2d 140, 14144 (Mass. 1987); Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983).
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nonsolicitation agreements and confidentiality agreements signed
by the individual defendants relying on affirmative conduct by the
defendants.115 In granting the injunction, the court relied on the
following evidence:
[T]he Individual Defendants met with [defendant’s] representatives repeatedly over a period of months while still employed [by
plaintiff], and emailed confidential [plaintiff] documents to their
personal email accounts during the same period; orchestrated
simultaneous resignations from [plaintiff]; sent [plaintiff’s]
clients targeted announcements of their move to [plaintiff’s
competitor]; sought and held meetings with several [plaintiff]
clients after joining [the competitor]; and persuaded at least one
[plaintiff] client ... to move its business to [the defendant].116

On the other hand, in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction,
the court in Cerro Fabricated Products L.L.C. v. Solanick granted an
injunction even without such affirmative acts.117 The court reasoned
that even though the defendant, absent evidence that he took any
documents with him, was likely to possess a significant amount of
confidential information in his memory, he would still be capable of
“compartmentalizing and confidential information” to avoid using
it with his new employer.118 Nevertheless, because defendants could
not present any evidence of steps taken, or that they intended to
take, in order to prevent the disclosure of the plaintiff’s trade secrets, there was a sufficient likelihood of disclosure of the trade
secret.119 Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was warranted.120
G. Misappropriation
To establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation under the
UTSA and the DTSA, a plaintiff has the burden of pleading and
proving that: (1) plaintiff owns a trade secret (or otherwise has
standing to sue); (2) that one or more of plaintiff’s trade secrets have
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

307 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330-31, 346-48, 350-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 347.
300 F. Supp. 3d 632, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
See id. at 653.
See id.
See id.
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been or are threatened to be misappropriated by the defendant; and
(3) that plaintiff is entitled to a remedy.121 Because the available
remedies are broad, the focus of trade secret misappropriation cases
is usually on the first and second requirements.122
An aspect of trade secret law that makes it different from patent,
copyright, and trademark law is its knowledge requirement.123 The
definition of misappropriation under all formulations of trade secret
law requires that the defendant “knows or has reason to know” of
the alleged trade secrets and the wrongful acts of misappropriation.124 In contrast, patent, copyright, and trademark laws are like
strict liability torts in that a defendant may be held liable for
patent, copyright, and trademark infringement even if he did not
know or have reason to know of the existence of plaintiff’s intellectual property rights.125
How a plaintiff attempts to prove the requisite knowledge in
trade secret cases depends upon the facts of each case, but direct
evidence of actual knowledge is not required.126 Knowledge or reason
to know can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.127 Of course,
where a defendant directly engages in the wrongful acts that constitute misappropriation, the requisite knowledge of such acts is
relatively easy to prove.128 The key in such cases is to prove that the

121. See Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d, 954, 968 (E.D. Wis. 2009)
(listing the elements of a prima facie case for trade secret misappropriation under California’s
version of the UTSA).
122. See id. at 968-69.
123. See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2014)
(“To be liable for trade secret misappropriation, however, one must ‘missappropriate’ the protected information....This requirement makes trade secret law unique and reflects how its
origins differ from those of patent and copyrights laws.”).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp IV. 2012); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 40 (AM . LAW
INST. 1995).
125. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
BERKELY TECH . L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002); N. Coast. Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d
1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992) (“To establish copyright infringement, the holder of the copyright
must prove both valid ownership of the copyright and that there was infringement of that
copyright by the alleged infringer.”).
126. See, e.g., Clorox Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d at 968-69.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. See, e.g., Beard Res., Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 599 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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defendant knew or had reason to know that the information he acquired, disclosed, or used was trade secret information.129
Circumstantial evidence can be presented and weighed to determine the likelihood that the defendant knew of the misappropriation, and a defendant cannot shield himself by “studious ignorance
of pertinent ‘warning’ facts.”130 A defendant’s constructive notice
that the information was a trade secret is sufficient.131
In Experian Information Solutions, Inc. v. Nationwide Marketing
Services Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the defendant
knew or had reason to know that it acquired and used the trade
secret that was obtained through improper means.132 In reviewing
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue, the
court noted that “improper acquisition and improper use of protected works [were] independent bases” for trade secret misappropriation.133 As an evidentiary matter, the defendant had “paid less
than 1% of the market rate for a one-time license” in order to obtain
ownership of the data at issue.134 The court found that this indicated
sufficient knowledge and that the low price paid by the defendant
supported plaintiff’s contention that the defendant had constructive
knowledge that the data in question had been obtained through
improper means.135 This evidence was sufficient to withstand summary judgment.136
In GE Betz, Inc. v. Moffitt-Johnston, the Fifth Circuit noted that
although circumstantial evidence is often relied upon to prove trade
secret misappropriation, in this case, a mere inference was not sufficient.137 Evidence of the defendant downloading company files,
lying about working for a competitor, and suspicions of soliciting
competitors at industry social events were too speculative to raise
an issue of material fact.138 The plaintiff also argued that it was
129.
130.
1980).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.
See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Mass.
See id.
893 F.3d 1176, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1189.
See id.
See id.
See id. 1189-90.
885 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 322-24.
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reasonable to infer from the defendant’s business plan that the
defendant used the plaintiff’s cost structure to acquire market
share.139 Nevertheless, the court found that “attempting to acquire
market share, even in part through lower margins, is a natural goal
for a business in its infancy, and it would be unreasonable to infer
from this broadly stated objective that [the defendant] planned to
use [the plaintiff’s] trade secrets.”140
C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler is a reminder of the importance of clear
contractual terms among business partners relating to ownership
of and access to proprietary information.141 The factual background
of this case spans almost a “dozen parties in the fashion technology
business and conduct that occurred on at least three continents.”142
In interpreting the terms of a distributorship agreement between
the parties, the court found that, among other things, the agreement
did not grant the defendants any rights to the source code at issue,
and as such, they could be liable for misappropriation.143 On the
other hand, with respect to a customer list that was used by the
defendants in their sales efforts, the court found that the distribution agreement did not prohibit such use by the defendants and
could not be misappropriation.144 The court also enforced the “binding forum selection clause in favor of the French courts,” that was
provided for in the agreement.145
How much of an advantage must a trade secret provide to a
defendant in order to constitute misappropriation? In Iconics, Inc.
v. Massaro, the court held that the advantage does not need to be
substantial.146 “If a misappropriator uses a trade secret even to some
small benefit, but fails to implement it in a way that maximizes its
value, it has still misappropriated the secret.”147 The court concluded
that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s implementation was merely inferior to plaintiff’s, but that any advantage,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 326.
Id.
298 F. Supp. 3d 727, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 734.
See id. at 759.
See id. at 761.
Id.
266 F. Supp. 3d 449, 460 (D. Mass. 2017).
Id.
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whether small or ephemeral, would still be enough to constitute
trade secret misappropriation.148
In Elenza, Inc. v. Alcon Labs. Holding Corp., the Supreme Court
of Delaware evaluated whether it was sufficient that the defendant
had “motive and opportunity” to misappropriate a trade secret.149 In
this case, the plaintiff attempted to show that the defendant had the
“motive and opportunity” to misappropriate its trade secrets based
on the defendant’s collaboration with other third parties and that
the defendant’s designs were “sufficiently similar” to plaintiff’s
based on the defendant’s patent application.150 The court found,
however, that this was insufficient to give rise to an inference of
misappropriation.151 It was not enough to show that they “could
have” used the plaintiff’s designs. Instead, they needed to point to
evidence in the patent application and elsewhere that the defendant
actually did.152
H. Non-Competes and Other Agreements
When employers wish to restrict employees from working for
competitors, they should enter into written restrictive covenants
(often labeled “Noncompetition Agreements” or “Noncompete
Agreements”) that are designed to protect their legitimate business
interests.153 By entering into a noncompetition agreement, the
employee usually agrees that for a specified period of time, after the
end of his or her employment, he or she will not work for any
company that is a competitor of the employer.154
Although it is too early after the adoption of the DTSA to have
definitive guidance on how federal courts will interpret section
1836(b)(3)(A)(i) of the DTSA, when cases allege violations of both
the DTSA and the state UTSA, many district courts seem to be
granting injunctions restraining employees and other defendants

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id.
183 A.3d 717, 725 (Del. 2018).
Id.
See id. at 725-26.
Id. at 726.
See, e.g., Hawkins v. Fishbeck, 301 F. Supp. 3d 650, 659-60 (W.D. Va. 2017).
See id.
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from competing with the trade secret owner in much the same way
that they would have done under the UTSA.155
Applying Virginia law, one district court held a noncompetition
agreement unenforceable in Hawkins v. Fishbeck.156 The agreement
provided that:
During the term of this Agreement and for a period of twelve
(12) months thereafter, Executive shall not, in any capacity
whatsoever, own, participate in the ownership of, manager [sic],
operate, exercise any control over, render services to, derive income from or engage in any of the foregoing for any business,
firm, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or
other entity which operates a business competitive with Employer.157

The court found the agreement overbroad for two reasons. First, it
went too far in restricting the roles that the employee could perform
for a competitor by prohibiting work “in any capacity whatsoever.”158
Second, the agreement contained no geographical limitation period,
and could restrict the employee from working in an area where he
never performed any functions for the former employer.159
I. Protective Orders and Requests to Seal
Because defendants in trade secret cases have the right to discover the identification and details of the plaintiff’s putative trade

155. See, e.g., T&S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Slanina, No. 6:16-03687-MGL, 2017 WL
1734362, at *13, *17 (D.S.C. May 4, 2017) (preliminary injunction granted despite an objection
that it would prevent the defendant from entering into an employment relationship); First W.
Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, No. 16-cv-1961-WJM-MJW, 2016 WL 8358549, at *6, *13 (D.
Colo. Sept. 30, 2016) (preliminary injunction granted in a case where the moving party
appears to have carefully limited the requested injunction to avoid any problems under the
DTSA, but where the injunction nonetheless prohibited the defendant from providing any
services to plaintiff’s existing and prospective clients); Panera, L.L.C. v. Nettles, No. 4:16-cv1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *2, *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016) (temporary restraining order
issued to enforce a confidentiality and noncompete agreement and to protect plaintiff’s trade
secrets).
156. See Hawkins, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 660-61.
157. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
158. See id.
159. See id.
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secrets,160 there is an obvious risk that whatever trade secrets exist
will be revealed during the course of the litigation. As a practical
matter, when presenting its case at trial, a plaintiff will have to
explain what its trade secrets are as part of its prima facie case.161
To facilitate the discovery process, most courts will issue protective
orders that are designed to protect plaintiff’s information during the
pendency of litigation.162 Indeed, both the UTSA and the DTSA
require courts to do so.163 Section 5 of the UTSA states:
“[A] court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by
reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders
in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera
hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any
person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade
secret without prior court approval.”164

Generally, it is easier to protect trade secrets during the pleading
and discovery phases of litigation than it is during trial.165 This is
because of the strong public policy favoring open and publicly accessible judicial proceedings.166
Accordingly, courts will sometimes restrict public access to court
proceedings in order to protect trade secrets, once the appropriate
showings have been made regarding trade secrecy status and the
lack of other reasonable alternatives to protect the information.167
Courts will also consider whether the parties to the litigation would
suffer competitive harm if their information were to be made pub160. See Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litigation: Solutions for
a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH . & INTELL. PROP. 68, 69, 71, 73 (2006).
161. See Rowe, supra note 33, at 1447.
162. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1223-24, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
163. See 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (Supp. IV 2016); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5 (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
164. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5.
165. See, e.g., Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins., 178 F.3d 943, 94445 (7th Cir. 1999).
166. See id. at 945 (“[T]he public at large pays for the courts and therefore has an interest
in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding. That interest does not always trump the
property and privacy interests of the litigants, but it can be overridden only if the latter
interests predominate in the particular case.” (citations omitted)).
167. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d. Cir. 1984).
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lic.168 If so, the court could order that certain information be sealed
from the public and third parties.169
Nevro Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp. serves as a reminder that
federal litigation is a public process, and that attorneys who file
frivolous sealing requests could be sanctioned.170 The Northern
District of California made it clear that potential embarrassment to
a company is not sufficient grounds for sealing documents that
should otherwise be available to the public.171 After denying a
request to seal documents, the court warned both parties that
frivolous requests would result in sanctions.172 The defendants again
filed another frivolous request, and the court issued an order to
show cause why the lawyers should not be sanctioned.173 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu,
which held that there must be “compelling reasons” to seal documents, guided the court.174 The Nevro court noted that:
At the hearing on the order to show cause, there was discussion
of the fact that attorneys—particularly attorneys for corporate
clients—are under great pressure to file motions to seal information that their clients would prefer to keep secret, even if there
is no legitimate basis to keep the information secret. This is no
doubt a significant issue for corporate lawyers, but the answer
is not to file frivolous sealing requests. The answer is to firmly
explain to their clients that litigation is a public process, and
that the public has the right to know what the litigation is
about, subject only to very limited exceptions.175

The court concluded that there was no justification for the sealing
request, and the request was objectively frivolous in violation of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.176
168. See id. at 1071-72.
169. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(sealing product-specific financial information from public disclosure).
170. 312 F. Supp. 3d 804, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
171. See id. at 805.
172. See id. at 804-05.
173. See id. at 805.
174. 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).
175. Nevro Corp., 312 F. Supp. 3d at 805.
176. See id.
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Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, addressed the Washington state Public
Records Act and whether it was appropriate to grant an injunction
preventing disclosure of records regarding car rides provided in each
zip code within the city.177 Following an evidentiary hearing, the
King County Superior Court had found that these records, were
trade secrets pursuant to the UTSA.178 The issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether records containing trade secrets
are “categorically excluded from public disclosure under the [Public
Records Act].”179 Lyft had agreed to “submit quarterly standardized
reports to the City that included the total number of rides, the
percentage of rides completed in each zip code, pick-up and drop-off
zip codes, the percentage of rides requested but unfulfilled, collision
data, and the number of requested rides for accessible vehicles.”180
In response to Lyft’s concerns regarding the confidentiality of some
of the information, the Seattle City Council enacted an ordinance
that provided that if a public records request were made for
documents that had been designated as confidential, the City would
inform the owner of the records request prior to disclosure.181
Accordingly, when a resident of Texas submitted a public records
request to the City, Lyft sought an injunction to prevent disclosure
of the requested reports.182 The court reasoned that no provision of
the Public Records Act exempted trade secrets from disclosure, and
therefore any exemption would need to be pursuant to another
statute (in this case, the UTSA).183 Yet, according to the court, the
“UTSA contains no specific exemption of trade secrets from public
disclosure laws.”184 The court began its UTSA analysis by determining whether the data at issue qualified for trade secret protection
under the UTSA.185 It concluded that the zip code reports constituted “a compilation of information consistent with the UTSA.”186
However, the court reasoned that the UTSA authorized an injunc177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

418 P.3d 102, 104 (Wash. 2018).
See id. at 106.
Id. at 110; see generally WASH . REV. CODE § 42.56 (2018).
Lyft, Inc., 418 P.3d at 105.
SEATTLE, WASH ., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.540(D) (2014).
Lyft, Inc., 418 P.3d at 106.
See id. at 106-07.
Id. at 108.
See id. at 108-09.
Id. at 109.
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tion only when there had been an actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.187 Therefore, “the City owed no legal duty to
maintain the confidentiality of the public records,” and did not have
authority to promise confidentiality in any manner that was inconsistent with the Public Records Act.188 The case was therefore
remanded back to the trial court for a fact-based determination of
whether injunctive relief was warranted under the “more stringent
in junction standards” of the Public Records Act, rather than the
“lesser UTSA standard” involving misappropriation between private
parties.189
The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Industrial Warehouse
Services., Inc., reviewed whether a party was entitled to a protective
order in response to a discovery request.190 A trucking company that
was sued as a result of injuries that occurred in an auto accident
involving a truck driven by one of its employees was seeking a protective order.191 As part of the personal injury litigation, the estates
of the parties who died from injuries incurred as a result of the
accident sent discovery requests to the trucking company.192 In
response, the trucking company sought a protective order to prohibit
dissemination “of its bills of lading and its operations and safety
manuals.”193 The circuit court denied the motion for protective order,
finding that the company failed to establish good cause under Rule
26(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.194 The company argued, however, that the information sought contained confidential
and trade secret information.195 The Alabama Supreme Court found
that the safety manuals were not trade secrets because the company
was required by federal law to report some of the information from
these sources to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.196
Furthermore, the information in the operations and safety manuals
contained information based on regulations that were applicable to
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 114.
Nos. 1170013 & 1170087, 2018 WL 1126576, at *1 (Ala. Mar. 2, 2018).
See id. at *1-2.
See id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
See id.
See id. at *4-5.
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the entire trucking industry, and were readily ascertainable from
public sources.197 As to the information contained in the bills of
lading, the court ruled that that information satisfied the definition
of a trade secret.198
J. Damages
The UTSA provides that “actual loss caused by misappropriation
and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not
taken into account in computing actual loss” can all be included as
a measure for trade secret damages.199 Accordingly, a trade secret
plaintiff may recover both actual losses and the “unjust benefit”
caused by the defendant.200 While compensatory damages can be
combined with injunctive relief, the UTSA cautions that “injunctive
relief ordinarily will preclude a monetary award for a period in
which the injunction is effective.”201
When there is evidence that the defendant used or disclosed the
trade secret, thus causing actual harm, an award of compensatory
damages is justified.202 The measure of damages in these circumstances is “likely to be the actual and potential value of the trade
secrets” to the plaintiff’s without the disclosure.203 A number of different measures are available to establish compensatory damages.
These include lost profits, erosion of market share, out-of-pocket
expenses, and advantage to the defendant.204
Title Source Inc. v. HouseCanary Inc.,from a Texas state court,
was one of the largest jury verdicts of 2018, with a total of over $706
million in compensatory and punitive damages.205 This case de197. See id. at *5.
198. See id.
199. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
200. Id. § 3 cmt.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. SANDEEN & ROWE, supra note 19, at 258-59.
204. See, e.g., Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir.
1974); Synergeering Group, L.L.C. v. Jonatzke (In re Jonatzke), 478 B.R. 846, 861 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2012).
205. Eric J. Fues & Maximilienne Giannelli, Title Source Inc. v. HouseCanary Inc., FIN NEGAN (May 29, 2018), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/title-source-inc.-v.-housecanaryinc.html [https://perma.cc/FQ4J-AUG4].
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serves attention not only because of the high damages award, but
because the damages went to the defendant on its counterclaim
against the plaintiff.206 The plaintiff, Title Source, filed suit against
HouseCanary, “alleging nonperformance under the license agreement and breach of the [nondisclosure agreement].”207 HouseCanary
then counterclaimed for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach
of contract, and fraud.208 The defendant’s tremendous success on its
counterclaim against the plaintiff serves as a note of caution to
plaintiffs to be careful what they start, especially when filing
actions potentially involving trade secrets.209
On a motion for summary judgment, the court in Repat, Inc. v.
IndieWhip, L.L.C., entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants because the plaintiff was unable to show proof of damages.210 The plaintiff argued that there was evidence of threatened
use by virtue of the fact that the defendant had an incentive to
exploit what it was able to learn from the plaintiff’s trade secrets.211
The court noted that while this argument might have been persuasive at the beginning of the litigation, two years had passed and
plaintiff’s business continued to thrive.212 “If [plaintiff] can find no
material evidence (direct or indirect) today that [defendant] has
made use of its proprietary marketing secrets in the interval, the
court is hard pressed to understand the nature of the ‘imminent and
irreparable harm’ that it is being asked to enjoin.”213 Therefore,
plaintiff could not “show any dispute of material fact over actual
damages, present or future, [and] failed to carry its burden of proof”
on the trade secrets claim.214
The issue of disgorgement and whether it could be decided by a
jury arose in two cases. First, the Ninth Circuit briefly addressed
disgorgement in GSI Technology, Inc. v. United Memories, Inc.,
noting that profit disgorgement was an equitable remedy to be de206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155,
195-96 (2017) (providing empirical data on the size of trade secret damage awards).
210. 281 F. Supp. 3d 221, 223-24 (D. Mass. 2017).
211. See id. at 231.
212. See id. at 231-32.
213. Id. at 232.
214. Id.
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cided by the trial court and not by the jury.215 Second, in Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America,
Inc., the Federal Circuit engaged in some historical analysis to
determine whether disgorgement of profits was available at law in
1791 for trade secret misappropriation; the Federal Circuit concluded that it was not.216 The jury in this case awarded disgorgement profits to the plaintiff based on what the plaintiff’s expert had
proposed.217 The evidence supporting this claim for monetary relief
did not limit the covered sales to a “head-start period.”218 The court
found that the absence of any limitation to a “head-start” could have
had significant consequences.219 If the disgorgement claim could not
have been brought in the law courts in 1791, then no right to a jury
trial would attach to that claim, and the plaintiff would not have the
constitutional right for a jury to decide the disgorgement question.220
The court in In re Mandel concluded that compensatory damages
in a trade secret case could be established with a flexible approach,
and a plaintiff should be given latitude to prove damages once
misappropriation has been shown.221 That being said, however, the
plaintiffs were required to produce enough credible evidence to show
“the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, even if the result be only approximate.”222 The dissent
cautioned, however, that “[o]ur flexible and creative standard is not
a license for pie-in-the-sky damages; rather, damages must be
grounded both in theory and fact.”223
The New York Court of Appeals in E.J. Brooks Co. v. Cambridge
Security Seals, held that a plaintiff cannot recover compensatory
damages measured by the cost a defendant avoided due to its
unlawful activity.224 Reviewing a question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as to whether “under New
York law, a plaintiff asserting claims of misappropriation of a trade
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

721 F. App’x 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2017).
888 F.3d 1322, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1336.
See id.
See id. at 1336-37.
See id. at 1337.
720 F. App’x 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 191 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 199.
No. 26, 2018 WL 2048724, at *1 (N.Y. May 3, 2018).
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secret, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment can recover
damages that are measured by the costs the defendant avoided due
to its unlawful activity,” the court answered the question in the
negative.225 In the underlying case, “the jury returned a verdict
finding [the defendant] liable for trade secret misappropriation,
unfair competition and unjust enrichment,” and assessing $1.3
million in compensatory damages on each claim (totaling $3.9
million).226 The defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law,
arguing that “avoided costs was an improper measure of
damages.”227 The trial court denied the motion, holding that avoided
costs could either measure the defendant’s gains or the plaintiff’s
losses.228 The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the
defendant “that damages in trade secret actions must be measured
by the losses incurred by the plaintiff,” and that they may not be
based on the infringers avoided development costs.229 Damages tied
to the defendant’s gains rather than the plaintiff’s losses were not
a permissible measure of damages.230 Recognizing that loss was
broadly defined in trade secret cases, the court noted, however, that
it was “neither automatically nor presumptively the case that costs
avoided by the defendant will be an adequate approximation of the
plaintiff’s investment losses, any more than it can be presumed that
the defendant’s sales would approximate those of the plaintiff.”231
The court further noted that the plaintiff’s actual costs were a better
measure than the defendant’s, as the plaintiff’s actual development
costs had been incurred and were a known quantity, while the defendants avoided costs were merely hypothetical.232
In Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Exploration, L.L.C., the Texas
Court of Appeals addressed whether the economic loss rule barred
recovery for misappropriation of trade secrets.233 A jury found the
defendant liable for trade secret misappropriation, and awarded the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id. at *2.
See id.
See id.
Id. at *6.
See id.
Id.
See id.
No. 01-15-00888-CV, 2018 WL 1870081, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).
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plaintiff “$14,300,000 in lost profits and $4,500,000 in exemplary
damages”.234 The defendant argued that the economic loss rule
barred the plaintiff’s misappropriation claim because it was based
on a confidentiality agreement and was thus recognizable only as a
contract claim.235 In this case, the plaintiff sought to recover lost
profits under both breach of a confidentiality agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets.236 The court noted that “the breach
of a confidential relationship may be a breach of contract and result
in contractual liability, but a breach of confidence also gives rise to
an independent claim for misappropriation of trade secrets,
regardless of contractual liability.”237 Accordingly, the court held
that “if the evidence is sufficient to show the elements of the tort of
misappropriation of trade secrets” independent from a contractual
obligation, the economic loss rule does not bar the misappropriation
claim.238
K. Permanent Injunctive Relief
In the absence of provable monetary damages (and often in addition thereto), the principal remedy for trade secret misappropriation is likely to be permanent injunctive relief.239 According to the
DTSA, such relief may be granted to enjoin actual or threatened
trade secret misappropriation “on such terms as the court deems
reasonable,” including with respect to the length of the injunction.240
The USTA limits the length of permanent injunctive relief in
trade secret cases to the period of time during which the subject
trade secrets remain secret.241 Presumably, the same limitation will
apply under the DTSA, but it remains to be seen whether, and to
what extent, federal courts rely upon state rules and decisions on
this issue, and what federal courts will determine to be reasonable.
234. Id.
235. See id. at *5.
236. See id. at *17.
237. Id. at *5.
238. Id. at *6.
239. See Rowe, supra note 209, at 195.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
241. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a).
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Once a plaintiff in a trade secret case proves misappropriation,
particularly in a UTSA jurisdiction or in a DTSA case, the plaintiff
may argue that they are “automatically” entitled to injunctive relief
because such relief is a statutorily prescribed remedy.242 Whether
this argument will work depends upon the law of the applicable
state and how the federal courts interpret and apply the DTSA.243
There is nothing in the language of the UTSA or DTSA that
specifically requires courts to apply “principles of equity,” as was the
case with patent law in the eBay case.244 However, consistent with
the common law origins of trade secret law, the grant of permanent
injunctive relief is ordinarily subject to principles of equity.245
Applicable law and the facts of each case will dictate the equitable
factors on which courts focus when deciding whether to grant permanent injunctive relief.246
The Federal Circuit in CardiAQ Valve Technologies, Inc. v.
Neovasc Inc., upheld the denial of a permanent injunction because
the requested injunction would have been duplicative of the monetary relief received by the plaintiff.247 The district court below also
had considered the uncertainty in the market, the impact the
injunction would have had on the defendant, and “the public’s
interest in having access to a potentially life-saving technology.”248
In TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Technologies., L.L.C., a court
of appeals in Texas reviewed whether a trial court erred in awarding both damages and permanent injunctive relief.249 The defendant
against whom the injunction was entered argued that the two remedies were duplicative, and that awarding both violated the onesatisfaction rule.250 The jury awarded “$4 million in reasonable
royalty-damages and $10,500 in lost profits” to the plaintiff.251 The
242. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., No. 3:09cv58, 2012 WL
4490547, at *5, *12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2012).
243. See id.
244. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006).
245. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 2012 WL 4490547, at *4-5, *7, *12, *16, *2223.
246. See id.
247. 708 F. App’x 654, 667-69 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
248. Id. at 667.
249. 540 S.W.3d 202, 204-05 (Tex. App. 2018).
250. See id. at 205.
251. Id. at 204.
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trial court entered judgment on those damages and also granted a
permanent injunction.252 In reviewing whether the reasonable royalty damages overlapped with the permanent injunction that
prohibited future use of the trade secrets, the court reasoned that
the reasonable royalty damages did not make the plaintiff whole.253
That is because the reasonable royalty damages awarded by the jury
were not based on actual future use of the trade secret, but were
meant to compensate purely for the misappropriation of the technology.254 The present value of the technology was “based in part on
potential for future use, regardless of whether that use came to
fruition.”255 In addition, the court found that the evidence at trial
showed that the plaintiff never intended the trade secrets to be
commercially available; thus, they were never intended to be licensed or otherwise used by a third-party.256 Accordingly, a reasonable royalty would not fully compensate for misappropriation of a
trade secret that the owner seeks to preserve for its exclusive use
and would not sell.257 The court further found that although the
royalty determination conceivably included future revenue that
licensing the trade secrets might have produced, “the trial court
reasonably could have concluded that this measure of actual
damages did not fully compensate [the plaintiff] absent an injunction because [the plaintiff] never intended that the trade secrets be
available in the marketplace.”258
L. DTSA Whistleblower Provision
The newest defense to a trade secret misappropriation claim is
provided by a provision of the DTSA which applies to all potential
criminal and civil trade secret liability, state or federal.259 This
defense is known as the “whistleblower immunity” or “whistleblower

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See id. at 204-05.
See id. at 210.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 211.
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
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defense,” and it specifies that certain disclosures of trade secrets
cannot serve as the basis of a trade secret claim.260
There are three parts to the DTSA’s whistleblower provision.
Subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) set forth the applicable immunity, stating that it applies in two situations.261 First, when a
“disclosure” of trade secrets is made “in confidence” to specified
government officials, and “solely for the purpose of reporting or
investigating a suspected violation of law.”262 Second, when the
disclosure “is made in a complaint or other document filed” in a
legal proceeding, and is filed “under seal,” presumably in accordance
with the rules of the applicable court.263
Subsection (b)(2) concerns the use of trade secrets in retaliation
lawsuits, allowing trade secrets to be disclosed by the plaintiff to his
or her attorney, provided that the trade secrets are kept confidential
and, if filed with the court, are filed under seal.264
Subsection (b)(3) does not immunize disclosures, but may affect
the availability of remedies in a trade secret misappropriation case
because it requires employers to give a specified notice to their
employees.265 If they fail to do so, “the employer may not be awarded
exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) or (D)
of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom
notice was not provided.”266 Significantly, “employee” is defined
broadly for purposes of the whistleblower immunity to include “any
individual performing work as a contractor or consultant for an
employer.”267
The first year of the DTSA had few reported decisions involving
the whistleblower immunity, but one case where it arose sparked
concerns about how the provision is being interpreted and applied.268 In Unum Group. v. Loftus, the court considered a Motion to
Dismiss based upon the whistleblower immunity and refused to
260. See id.; see also Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 92, 93-94 (2017).
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)-(B).
262. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
263. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(B).
264. Id. § 1833(b)(2)(A).
265. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A)-(D).
266. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
267. Id. § 1833 (b)(4).
268. See Menell, supra note 260, at 94-97.
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grant it, ruling that application of the immunity required findings
of fact that could not be determined on a Motion to Dismiss.269 This
sparked concern by the author of the DTSA provision that the
immunity is being treated like an affirmative defense that a
defendant must plead and prove, rather than as an immunity that
can be raised in a Motion to Dismiss.270
The whistleblower provision was subsequently applied in Christian v. Lannett Co.271 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the defendant’s federal counterclaims for trade secret
misappropriation against the plaintiff.272 A former employee sued
the defendant pharmaceutical company for discrimination, and the
company counterclaimed, alleging that the former employee had
transferred 22,000 pages of company documents to her attorney and
had retained company trade secrets after her employment was
terminated.273 However, the court found that those documents fell
within the immunized disclosure parameters defined by the DTSA:
Plaintiff’s alleged disclosure was made to Plaintiff’s counsel
pursuant to a discovery Order of this Court, within the context
of a lawsuit regarding violations of Title VII, the ADA, and the
FMLA. Therefore, said disclosure to counsel cannot be used to
allege a continuing misappropriation of the documents acquired
before the DTSA enactment date.274

The DTSA requires employers to provide notice of its whistleblower immunity provisions.275 Failure to do so prevents recovery of
attorney’s fees or exemplary damages.276 In Xoran Holdings L.L.C.
v. Luick, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, again interpreting
the DTSA, applied the whistleblower immunity provision to bar the
plaintiff from recovering attorney’s fees or exemplary damages on
269. 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D. Mass. 2016).
270. See Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, THE CLS. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/
01/03/misconstruing-whistleblower-immunity-under-the-defend-trade-secrets-act [https://
perma.cc/3S3P-GR7L].
271. No. CV-16-963, 2018 WL 1532849 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018).
272. See id. at *1.
273. See id. at *1-2.
274. Id. at *4.
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016).
276. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
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its DTSA claim because it had not provided notice of the whistleblower immunity provision in its employment agreement or anywhere else.277
II. CRIMINAL UPDATE
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) is the federal statute
criminalizing trade secret misappropriation and espionage.278 The
EEA gives federal authorities, including the US Department of
Justice and local federal prosecutors, “the power to investigate and
prosecute individuals or companies who engage in criminal trade
secret misappropriation.”279 Considering “the indictments that have
been brought under the EEA, the vast majority of prosecutions
involve employees, former employees, and other company
‘insiders.’”280 However, acts of corporate espionage by outsiders are
also covered by the EEA.281
The EEA contains two main sections that address specifically
theft of trade secrets to benefit a foreign government (section 1831),
and more generally, all other theft of trade secrets (section 1832).282
Section 1832 is the more widely utilized section, and it prohibits
intentionally or knowingly “convert[ing] a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate
or foreign commerce.”283 It is worth noting that a defendant can be
prosecuted under the EEA even if no trade secrets were actually
stolen.284 That is because both section 1831 and 1832 “make an
attempt to steal trade secrets and a conspiracy to steal trade secrets
a crime.”285
The EEA also has extraterritorial reach and can be applied even
where conduct does not occur on U.S. soil.286 Section 1837 extends
277. No. 16-13703, 2017 WL 4039178, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017).
278. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112269, 126 Stat. 2442 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012)).
279. Rowe, supra note 86, at 387; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
280. Rowe, supra note 86, at 387.
281. Id.
282. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832.
283. Id. § 1832(a).
284. See Rowe, supra note 86, at 388.
285. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(4)-(5), 1832 (a)(4)-(5).
286. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837; see also Rowe, supra note 86, at 394.
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jurisdiction if (a) the defendant is a U.S. citizen or corporation, or (b)
any “act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States.”287 In practice, this provision has not been widely used by
prosecutors due to the accompanying challenges of enforcement and
service in foreign countries.288
The penalties under the EEA include both fines and prison
sentences.289 Violations under section 1831 may result in fines of up
to $5 million for individuals, and up to $10 million or three times
the value of the trade secrets for organizations.290 The maximum
term of imprisonment is fifteen years.291 The DTSA increased the
financial penalties for organizations from a maximum of $5 million
to the greater of $5 million or three times the value of the trade
secrets.292 For individuals, the prison term is ten years.293
Overall, the number of prosecutions under the EEA have been
relatively low since its enactment in 1996.294 The past year has
produced a steady pace of activity relating to federal criminal trade
secret offenses.295 Headlines from a number of convictions and indictments from the past year are highlighted below.296 It is worth
observing that these cases of espionage often involve well-known
companies, high-level employees,297 and competitors seeking to acquire technology.298

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

18 U.S.C. § 1837.
See Rowe, supra note 86, at 394.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)-(b).
Id.
Id. § 1831(a).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
Id. § 1831(a) (2012).
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH , THE COMMISSION ON THE THEFT OF
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 43 (May 2013), http://www.
ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_ 052213.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG42-YUMX].
295. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
296. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
297. In an upcoming article I will explore this phenomenon of scientists, engineers, and
executives as criminals under the EEA.
298. See infra Part II.A, II.B.
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A. Convictions
1. Former DuPont Employee Pleads Guilty
Josh Harry Isler admitted that while employed with DuPont, he
accepted employment with a competitor of DuPont in the ethanol
fuel enzyme business.299 While still employed with DuPont, and
after accepting his new employment, Isler downloaded proprietary
information and trade secrets belonging to DuPont, and many of the
files related to DuPont’s customers, who were also potential customers of his new employer.300
2. Jury Convicts Electrical Engineer for Theft from Defense
Contractor
On July 9, 2018, a jury in Hartford, Connecticut found Jared
Dylan Sparks, an electrical engineer who worked for a defense
contractor (LBI, Inc.), guilty of trade secret theft.301 LBI “designed
and built unmanned underwater vehicles” for the Navy.302 Sparks
left LBI to work for Charles River Analytics.303 Before leaving,
Sparks uploaded thousands of LBL files to his Dropbox account,
which included accounting and engineering files, as well as photos
related to designs and renderings used to make the unmanned underwater vehicles.304

299. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former DuPont Employee Pleads Guilty to
Stealing Trade Secrets and Lying to the FBI (July 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usaondia/pr/former-dupont-employee-pleads-guilty-stealing-trade-secrets-and-lying-fbi [http://
perma.cc/ 3JZ9-YF9Y].
300. See id.
301. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electrical Engineer Found Guilty for Intending to Convert Trade Secrets from Defense Contractor (July 10, 2018), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/electrical-engineer-found-guilty-intending-convert-trade-secrets-defensecontractor [http://perma.cc/JWD4-336X].
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
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3. Sinovel Convicted and Fined for Theft from AMSC
A jury in Madison, Wisconsin convicted Sinovel Wind Group of
conspiracy to commit trade secret theft from AMSC.305 “Sinovel stole
proprietary wind turbine technology from AMSC” to produce its own
turbines.306 The “[c]ourt found that AMSC’s losses from the theft
exceeded $550 million.”307 Sinovel received the statutory maximum
fine of $1.5 million and one year probation.308 The company was also
ordered to pay restitution of about $57 million.309
4. Former Chemours Employee Pleads Guilty
On June 8, 2018, Jerry Jindong Xu, a Canadian citizen, pled
guilty to conspiracy to steal trade secrets related to sodium cyanide
from The Chemours Company.310 Chemours was formed in 2015
from DuPont’s chemicals business, and the company “performs the
research and development for sodium cyanide products.”311 Xu previously worked for DuPont in China.312 He admitted to, among other
things, misleading his colleagues in order to accumulate pricing
information, using personal email accounts to transfer confidential
information, using an “encrypted Chinese-based messaging service
to communicate with his co-conspirators,” and receiving information
from a “Chinese investor who indicated that it is common practice
in China to steal technology from others.”313

305. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Court Imposes Maximum Fine on Sinovel
Wind Group for Theft of Trade Secrets (July 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/courtimposes-maximum-fine-sinovel-wind-group-theft-trade-secrets [http://perma.cc/V68C-RK5R].
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Chemours Employee Pleads Guilty
to Theft of Trade Secrets Conspiracy in Bid to Lure Chinese Investors into Sodium Cyanide
Market (June 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-de/pr/former-chemours-employee-pleadsguilty-theft-trade-secrets-conspiracy-bid-lure-chinese [http://perma.cc/2MNT-ZC2S].
311. Id.
312. See id.
313. Id.
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5. Scientist Convicted for Theft of Engineered Rice
Weiqiang Zhang was convicted in February 2017 for acquiring,
without authorization, genetically programmed rice seeds which are
used in the therapeutic and medical fields.314 These seeds have
various applications in health research, and Ventria, the defendant’s former employer, spent millions of dollars finding costeffective methods to extract proteins from the rice seeds.315 Zhang
provided the seeds to representatives of a Chinese crop institute
when they visited him at his home in Manhattan, Kansas.316 He was
sentenced to 121 months in prison.317
6. Developer Pleads Guilty and Sentenced to Five Years in
Prison
Xu Jiaqiang pled guilty to stealing proprietary source code from
his former employer to benefit the National Health and Family
Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China.318 The
defendant worked as a developer for the company and had access to
the underlying source code.319 At various times, the defendant communicated with two undercover officers who posed as a financial
investor and a project manager, respectively.320 He also uploaded
proprietary source code to a server set up by the FBI.321 He was
sentenced to five years in prison.322

314. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chinese Scientist Sentenced to Prison in
Theft of Engineered Rice (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-scientistsentenced-prison-theft-engineered-rice [http://perma.cc/6RLS-JFJZ].
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade Secret from U.S. Company (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www. justice.
gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-economic-espionage-and-theft-trade-secret-us-company
[http://perma.cc/8G57-LDAT].
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
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7. Former Executive Convicted for Trade Secret Theft from
Medical Company
Christopher Barry, former Vice President of Research and
Development for Lutonix, Inc., pled guilty to theft of trade secrets
for the benefit of his new employer, a startup medical device
company.323 The defendant had been “responsible for all research
and development, quality assurance, and manufacturing” for his
former employer.324 He stole trade secret files in order to use the
proprietary information in connection with his new employment and
to transfer those files to his new employer.325 He was sentenced to
twelve months and one day in prison, three years supervised
release, and is required to pay $533,842 in restitution.326
8. Chicago Trader Convicted for Theft of His Employer’s
Trading Code
David Newman pled guilty to theft of trade secrets for downloading and stealing “all of the proprietary computer code and trading software belonging to his employer,” WH Trading LLC.327 He
apparently downloaded over 400,000 files to multiple USB thumb
drives and then resigned from the company to establish his own
trading firm.328 He intended to use the stolen trade secrets to
compete with his former employer.329 Proprietary codes are used for
“pricing futures and options contracts, executing trades on various
exchanges, analyzing the risk of trades, and interpreting exchange

323. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Lutonix Executive Sentenced to a
Year and a Day in Prison for Stealing Trade Secrets (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
usao-mn/pr/former-lutonix-executive-sentenced-year-and-day-prison-stealing-trade-secrets
[http://perma.cc/G3X4-RTBF].
324. Id.
325. See id.
326. Id.
327. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chicago Trader Sentenced to a Year in Federal
Prison for Stealing Proprietary Trading Secrets from His Employer (June 5, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/chicago-trader-sentenced-year-federal-prison-stealingproprietary-trading-secrets-his [https://perma.cc/GVY3-BMKM].
328. See id.
329. See id.
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market data.”330 He was sentenced to one year and one day in prison
and fined $100,000.331
9. Engineer Pleads Guilty to Selling Secrets to Russian Spy
Gregory Allen Justice pled guilty to “selling sensitive satellite
information to a person he believed to be an agent of a Russian intelligence service.”332 Justice was an engineer who worked for a
defense contractor on military and commercial satellite programs.333
After stealing the proprietary trade secrets from his employer,
Justice provided them to an undercover FBI agent who he believed
was a Russian agent.334 He received thousands of dollars in cash
payments in exchange for the proprietary trade secrets.335
B. Indictments
1. Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees Indicted
On June 14, 2018, six former and current Fitbit employees were
indicted in the Northern District of California for alleged federal
trade secret offenses.336 The individuals are accused of either stealing market research regarding fitness tracker opportunities from
Jawbone, or stealing internal studies—including a comparison study
of consumer behavior in which consumers wore both Jawbone and
Fitbit devices.337 The employees were charged with felony “posses-

330. Id.
331. See id.
332. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defense Contractor Employee Pleads Guilty to
Selling Satellite Secrets to Undercover Agent Posing as Russian Spy (May 22, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-contractor-employee-pleads-guilty-selling-satellite-secretsundercover-agent-posing-0 [https://perma.cc/AQ5J-BXTT].
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees
Indicted for Possessing Multiple Trade Secrets Stolen from Jawbone (June 14, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/six-former-and-current-fitbit-employees-indicted-possessingmultiple-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/AE2R-BC48].
337. See id.
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sion of stolen trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(3),”
for which the maximum sentence is 10 years in prison.338
This indictment is particularly interesting because in 2015, Jawbone sued Fitbit, including these same individuals, “for ‘systematically plundering’ trade secrets, including over 300,000 confidential
files.”339 After a nine-day trial, the International Trade Commission
(ITC) ruled in favor of Fitbit and the individuals.340 The administrative law judge determined on the merits that “no Jawbone trade
secrets were misappropriated or used in any Fitbit product.”341
Nevertheless, U.S. federal prosecutors decided to move forward with
a criminal prosecution.342 The indictment states that the defendants
“received and possessed one or more of the trade secrets for the
economic benefit of someone other than Jawbone ... [and] each
defendant was aware following his or her departure from Jawbone
that the trade secrets were stolen and that they were being possessed without authorization.”343 This criminal case is worth following to see how it unfolds in light of the findings in the ITC
proceeding.
2. Former Apple Employee Indicted
On July 12, 2018, a grand jury in San Jose indicted Xiaolang
Zhang for allegedly taking “a confidential 25-page document containing detailed schematic drawings of a circuit board designed to
be used ... in an autonomous vehicle.”344 Zhang told Apple that he
was resigning from his job to return to China to be closer to his
mother, but they subsequently learned that he was going to work for
338. Id.
339. Shannon Liao, Feds Charged Six Current and Former Fitbit Employees for Stealing
Trade Secrets From Jawbone, THE VERGE (June 15, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/circuit
breaker/2018/6/15/17467820/fitbit-employees-charged-stolen-jawbone-trade-secrets-jawbone
[https://perma.cc/SPB2-YTNY].
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six Former and Current Fitbit Employees Indicted for
Possessing Multiple Trade Secrets Stolen from Jawbone, supra note 336.
343. See id.
344. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Apple Employee Indicted on Theft of
Trade Secrets (July 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/former-apple-employeeindicted-theft-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/T6PS-QTFW].
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a Chinese company “focused on electric automobiles and autonomous vehicle technology.”345 After the company discovered that
Zhang had allegedly downloaded information from project databases
containing trade secrets, Federal agents intercepted and arrested
him at the San Jose International Airport.346
3. Man Arrested for Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets from
Medrobotics Corp.
Dong Liu, a dual citizen of China and Canada, was arrested and
charged with attempting to steal trade secrets from Medrobotics
Corporation, headquartered in Raynham, Massachusetts.347 Medrobotics manufactures a robot-assisted device used by surgeons to
access “hard-to-reach places in the human body for minimally invasive surgery.”348 He was arrested after being caught by the CEO
of Medrobotics sitting in a conference room at the company with
three open laptop computers.349 He was not authorized to be on the
premises and he gave conflicting explanations for why he had
entered the building.350
4. Man Indicted for Stealing Trade Secrets to Benefit Rival
Firm in China
Robert O’Rourke had worked for a Woodstock-based manufacturer of cast-iron products since 1984.351 In 2015, O’Rourke allegedly
began discussions with a Chinese company to take a similar position
as vice president with the Chinese company.352 According to the
345. Id.
346. See id.
347. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dual Canadian/Chinese Citizen Arrested for
Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets and Computer Information (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.
justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/dual-canadianchinese-citizen-arrested-attempting-steal-trade-secretsand-computer [https://perma.cc/9386-6ENA].
348. Id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Businessman Indicted for Allegedly Stealing Employer’s Trade Secrets While Planning for New Job with Rival Firm in China (July 20, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/businessman-indicted-allegedly-stealing-employer-strade-secrets-while-planning-new-job [https://perma.cc/WM44-7RVF].
352. See id.
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indictment, O’Rourke allegedly took the proprietary information
from the Woodstock company and intended to catch a flight from
Chicago to China.353 He was arrested at the O’Hare International
Airport by federal authorities.354
5. Russian Officers Charged for Hacking Yahoo Email
Accounts
Four defendants, including two offices of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), were indicted by a grand jury in the Northern
District of California in March 2017.355 They allegedly used “unauthorized access to Yahoo’s systems to steal information from
about at least 500 million Yahoo accounts” and then used the stolen
information to access other accounts at Google and other webmail
providers.356 Among the accounts accessed were those of Russian
journalists, as well as U.S. and Russian government officials.357
Private-sector employees of financial, transportation, and other
companies were also targeted.358
6. Chinese Hackers Charged for Intrusions Against Moody’s,
Siemens, and Trimble
Three Chinese nationals were indicted for computer hacking and
theft of trade secrets in November 2017.359 They allegedly conspired
to hack into private corporate servers to steal confidential business
information.360 They did so by exploiting employees’ computers and
conducting “spearphish” email campaigns to deploy “malicious code”
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their
Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts (March 15, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-conspiratorshacking-yahoo-and-millions [https://perma.cc/F2TZ-DGPK].
356. Id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers Who
Work at Internet Security Firm for Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-three-chinese-hackers-who-workinternet-security-firm-hacking-three-corporations [https://perma.cc/WSH5-5SG7].
360. See id.
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into the companies’ computer networks.361 The victim companies
were Moody’s Analytics, Siemens AG, and Trimble, Inc.362 The hackers worked for the China-based Internet security firm Guangzhou
Bo Yu Information Technology Company Limited.363
CONCLUSION
We are in the second year following enactment of the federal
DTSA, which governs trade secret misappropriation concurrently
with the state-based UTSA.364 This Article highlighted some noteworthy cases from select federal and state courts during the past
year, arranged topically to follow the life cycle of a trade secret case
from filing to damages.365 It is evident that the majority of the cases
are still being decided under the UTSA, and that there does not appear to be any significant doctrinal departures in the case law so
far.366 This Article also provided headline updates from the past
year on criminal convictions and indictments under the Economic
Espionage Act.367 These cases continue to reflect cloak-and-dagger
patterns that involve well-known companies, high-level employees
(often foreign citizens), and competitors seeking to acquire technology.368
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